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Preferential Trading Arrangements in
Western Hemisphere Countries
Barry Krissoff and Jerry Sharples
Many countries of the Western Hemisphere in recent years have shown interest in
participating in preferential trading arrangements (PTA) in anticipation of expanding exports.
Results in this paper show that export expansion depends upon the type of agreement that is
formed and who else is participating. Trade of two agricultural commodities are examined;
wheat, and fruit and vegetablejuices.Five~As are examinedeactrincluding theunited
States and one or more‘WesternHemisphere countries.
Recently the United States and a number of other
Western Hemisphere countries have shown interest
in participating in preferential trade agreements
(PTA). 1A PTA would reduce or remove tariff and
nontariff barriers to trade between the countries of
the PTA, but each country’s barriers to trade with
non-member countries would remain unchanged.
The most common reason for a country to want to
join a PTA is to expand its exports.
In the context of recent events in the Western
Hemisphere, there are several alternative types of
PTAs that could evolve. The objective of this pa-
per is to see if the type of PTA matters for trade of
agricultural commodities. Two “case-study”
commodities are examined: wheat, and fruit and
vegetable juices.
In a recent article by Richard Lipsey entitled
“The Case for Trilateralism”, Lipsey outlines
three models of PTAs: the hub-and-spoke model,
overlapping regional free trade areas, and plurilat-
eral regionalism. In the hub-and-spoke model, one
country, presumably the United States, could have
separate bilateral free-trade agreements with each
of the participating countries (Wonnacott). For ex-
ample, suppose the United States had separate
trade agreements with Canada, Mexico, and Chile.
While the “hub”, the United States, could gain
tariff free access to these individual countries (the
spokes), the “spokes” could only gain tariff free
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1The interests of the United States were expressed in a 1990 White
House press release. It stated, “A comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
for Latin America is our long-term goal. ” (p. 2)
access to the United States. The “spokes” would
not realize gains vis-a-vis other spokes.
In the overlapping regional free trade model,
two countries such as the United States and Mex-
ico would form a free trade agreement, Some
countries might express interest in forming a free
trade agreement with Mexico (e.g. Costa Rica),
while other countries might initiate interest with
the United States (e.g. Chile). A series of overlap-
ping agreements could evolve in which the U.S.
and Mexico would be included in some arrange-
ments, while excluded in others. The practicality
of enforcing an overlapping free trade area would
be complex; a particular concern would be trans-
shipment across free trade areas and rules of origin
criteria.
In the plurilateral regional model, several coun-
tries would establish a regional free trade area in
which all members received tariff-free access to
the markets of all other members, This stands in
contrast to the hub-and-spoke model in which only
the hub country had tariff free access to the mar-
kets of all the spokes. For example, instead of the
United States having separate bilateral agreements
with Canada and Mexico, these three countries
would sign one agreement establishing common
access to each other’s market—a North American
Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Any other countries
interested in joining the regional arrangement
would conform with the terms of NAFTA. A coun-
try, such as Chile, may want to “sign-up” with
NAFTA.2
2 Potential problems with transshipment may nccur with all three
typesof p’rAs described. Non-member countries may attempt to export
their products through a member country with the lowest tariff,Krissoff and Sharples Preferential Trading Arrangements 49
Of the three types of trade arrangements, the
United States and other Western Hemisphere coun-
tries have expressed the most interest in plurilateral
regional arrangements. Nevertheless, participation
and the process of negotiation seems to be uncer-
tain at the present time.
Here, our goal is to examine how country par-
ticipation and the type of agreement affect agricul-
tural trade. Our approach is to undertake several
simulation exercises which are intended to repre-
sent different preferential trading arrangements in
Western Hemisphere countries. We examine the
impacts on gains to trade if the United States,
Mexico, and Canada were to sign an agreement.
Then, we compare and contrast the changes in
trade if a parallel agreement were formed by Mer-
cosur (as proxied by Argentina and Brazil). The
hub-and-spoke case is explored next; the U.S. is
assumed to form bilateral agreements with several
Western Hemisphere countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico). Finally,
in our last experiment, we address the trade effects
of a regional agreement where all participants re-
move their import protection vis-a-vis all partner
countries.
Our analysis separately examines two agricul-
tural commodities: wheat, and fruit and vegetable
juices. We choose these products to serve as ex-
amples because of their importance to at least one
exporting Western Hemisphere country and be-
cause of the various patterns of bilateral trade these
goods represent in the Western Hemisphere. For
example, the United States is a major exporter of
wheat and a net importer of fruit and vegetable
juices. In order to maintain a database of manage-
able size, we restricted our analysis to the Western
Hemisphere countries of United States, Canada,
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and
a Rest-of-World region.
These alternatives are examined with two sin-
gle-commodity, static equilibrium, world trade
models,
Agricultural Trade F1OWS of Western
Hemisphere Countries
Reviewing trade patterns provides a good basis for
determining the qualitative importance of various
preferential trading arrangements. The source of
our data set is the UN Trade Statistics, which con-
tains data on trade flows for the Western Hemi-
sphere countries through 1987. Although this data
source is generally considered not as accurate or as
up-to-date as U.S. data sources (Foreign Agricul-
tural Trade of the United States, FATUS, USDA),
it is the only single source of bilateral trade infor-
mation.
Wheat
The data on wheat trade suggest that any type of
agreement would have small effects on United
States and Canada but would be more significant
for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Colom-
bia depending on the type of arrangement. Of the
Western Hemisphere countries considered, three
are exporters and four are importers. The United
States, Canada, and Argentina are major world ex-
porters with shares of world wheat trade of 34, 17,
and 5 percent, respectively, in our 1987 base pe-
riod. In contrast, the importing countries have very
small shares of the world import market: Brazil has
approximately 3 percent, Mexico and Colombia
0.5 percent, and Chile a negligible percent, The
importance of these importing countries to the
three exporters also tend to be small with one ex-
ception; 27 percent of Argentina’s exports are pur-
chased by Brazil in 1987.
From the importer’s perspective the three ex-
porting countries are critical. Mexico, Brazil, and
Colombia rely on the United States, Canada, and
Argentina for approximately 70 percent of their
imports. Mexico imports mostly from Canada,
Brazil, mostly from Argentina, and Colombia
mostly from the United States. Chile imports al-
most all its wheat from the United States. Since the
bilateral trading patterns are different across the
exporters and importers, “who is in and who is out
of an agreement” could lead to significant changes
in the pattern of trade.3
Fruit and Vegetable Juices
All of the countries in our Western Hemisphere
sample are exporters of fruit and vegetable juices.
However, only Brazil and the United States com-
prise a significant share of world exports, roughly
estimated at 30 and 10 percent, respectively
(1987). Argentina and Mexico have expressed in-
terest in increasing their trade in fruit and vegeta-
ble juices which equal 4 and 2 percent, respec-
tively, of world exports. The United States is also
3 To put the 1987 trading patterns in perspective, we reviewed the
bilateral trade flows of wheat over the 198&87 period, From the US,
and Canadian viewpoint, the Western Hemisphere countries were small
importers in any given year. However, 1987 dld represent a year in
which Western Hemisphere import shares of U.S. and Canadian wheat
were smaller than in earlier periods. This, perhaps, reflects Latin Amer-
ican countries’ foreign exchange constraints and negative or low real
growrh rates in the late 19gOs. Brazil’s importance as an importer of
Argentine wheat, though, was nearly at a high point in 1987.Xl April 1YY3 .-. .. ... . ARER
a major importer purchasing approximately 35 per-
cent of world trade. Thus, there are three key dif-
ferences in the fruit and vegetable juice traded
market relative to the wheat market: first, the
United States is the major importer in the Western
Hemisphere rather than the major exporter; sec-
ond, there is one country (Brazil) other than the
United States which is a predominant international
seller of fruit and vegetable juices and several
smaller exporters and potential exporters in the re-
gion which provide additional competition and;
third, the exporters and importers in the region rely
heavily on each other for fruit and vegetable trade.
Western Hemisphere fruit and vegetable juice
exporters are very dependent on the United States
as an importer. Nearly 60 percent of Brazilian fruit
and vegetable juice trade is shipped to the United
States. Almost all of Brazilian exports is frozen
concentrate orange juice (fcoj). For Argentina and
Mexico, the United States accounts for over 60 and
90 percent share of their export markets, Approx-
imately 80 percent of Mexican juice exports are
orange juice. Argentina exports no orange juice.
From a U.S. import perspective, the Western
Hemisphere exporters are also essential trading
partners. In 1987, the U.S. purchased approxi-
mately 70 percent of its fruit and vegetable juice
imports from Western Hemisphere countries: 57
percent from Brazil, 7 percent from Argentina, and
6 percent from Mexico, respectively, in 1987.
Thus, there is dependency and symmetry in the
fruit and vegetable juice market with the United
States being the key importer and Brazil being the
key exporter.4
Modeling Framework
A simple trade model is used here to evaluate the
potential effects of a PTA on individual commod-
ity trade. It is based on the Armington version
(which allows for bilateral trade flows) of the
Static World Policy Simulation (SWOPSIM) mod-
eling framework developed by Roningen.
We will discuss the characteristics of the model
that are most relevant to this paper. (For more
details see Dixit and Roningen, and Roningen,
Sullivan, and Dixit.) Assume a three-country case
for a single good in which consumers distinguish
4 The export position of the United States and Brazil have changed
dramaticallyover the 1980 decade. Brazil increased its quantity of ex-
pects over 90 percent in the 198G87 period. As an exporter of fcuits and
vegetable juices, U.S. sales declined over 30 percent from the early
1980s. As U.S. exports declined, the U.S. shipped more to Rest-of-
Worldin 1987(72 percent) and less to Western Hemisphere countries.
purchases by country of origin. 5The “home coun-
try” consumes its own produced product (j) and
consumes (imports) similar but not identical <‘for-
eign” produced products from countries (i) and
(k). The consumer demand functions for commod-
ity j in countries i, j, and k, are represented by:
(1) Dij = Dij(CPii, CPij, CPik)
(2) Djj = Djj(CPii, CPij, CPik)
(3) Dkj = Dkj(CPii, CPij, CPik)
where CPii, CPij, CPik are the consumer incentive
prices of product j in countries i, j, and k respec-
tively.6
The supply of product j (which is only produced
in country j) is a function of its own price
(4) Sjj = Sjj(PPjj)
where PPjj is the producer incentive price in coun-
try j. Product j is by definition only exported by
country j (Sjj – Djj) and imported by countries i
and k (–Dij and – Dkj).
Consumer incentive prices of product j in each
country are determined by domestic policies, tariff
and nontariff barriers, and the traded price:
(5) CPij = CSWij + Ei * TPj
(6) CPjj = CSWjj + Ej * TPj
(7) CPkj = CSWkj + Ek * TPj
where CSWs are policy created price wedges, Es
are exchange rates in local currency per U.S. dol-
lar, and TPj is the traded price for product j. In-
ternational transaction costs are assumed to equal
O.Thus, the incentive consumer price is defined as
equal to the traded price and a price wedge gener-
ated by quantifying agricultural policies. In the
simulation experiments only the trade policy com-
ponent (not the domestic policy component) is re-
moved from the CSW.
The producer price of product j is determined by
domestic and trade policy and the traded price:
(8) PPjj = PSWjj + Ej * TPj
where PSWjj is a domestic or trade policy created
price wedge. World markets clear when net trade
of product j across all countries (i,j,k) is equal to O:
(9) Tj = Sjj – Dij – Djj – Dkj
= o.
5In the experiments discussed below the two single-commodity mod-
els contain seven countries and a Rest-of-World region.
6 An “incentive price” is the observed market price plus positive or
negative incentives such as subsidies and taxes.Krissoff and Sharples Preferential Trading Arrangements 51
Equations for i and k can be similarly expressed.
All supply and demand functions are defined
such that an equilibrium solution of the model re-
produces all prices and quantities observed in
1987. Wecallthis our base solution which is as-
sumed to be in intermediate-run equilibrium.
When an exogenous change occurs in a policy
variable, in particular the removal of an import
tariff or nontariff barrier (CSWij or CSWik), the
model generates a new equilibrium by recalculat-
ing domestic supply and demand levels, rebalanc-
ing world trade, production, consumption, and
prices in the process. The pattern of prices and
quantities observed in the base solution can then be
compared to the pattern which emerges from the
simulation exercise.
There are three sets of key parameters that de-
termine the results. They are (1) base supply, de-
mand, and trade dat~ (2) base prices and the price
wedges that are removed by PTAs; and (3) own-
price elasticities of each commodity and the elas-
ticities of substitution in consumption among dif-
ferent country sources of the product. The Arm-
ington assumption—consumers distinguish the
purchase of a commodity by country of origin—is
parsimonious in parameter needs; the own price
elasticity, the elasticity of substitution, and base
shares are sufficient to generate own and cross
price elasticities for each product.7 The elasticities
are assumed and can be found in Sullivan, Wainio,
and Roningen for wheat and Liapis, Krissoff, and
Neff (LKN) for juices. (The Mexican elasticities
reported in LKN are used for the other Latin Amer-
ican countries. ) Base quantities and prices are from
UN Trade Data and FAO Production Yearbook,
The base data and parameters are available in elec-
tronic form upon request of the authors.
Simulation Analysis
To reflect different country participation in PTAs,
five simulation experiments are undertaken for
wheat and four for fruit and vegetable juices (see
Figure 1), In the experiments import policies are
only removed vis-a-vis other participating coun-
tries.
The quantification of wheat import policies is
based on PSC/CSE calculations and includes all
policy transfers to producers through price inter-
vention (Webb, USDA). Of the importing coun-
tries, Brazil in 1987, had the highest import tariff
Experiment 1: {US- Mexico}
Experiment 2: {NAfTA: US - Mexico - Canada)
Experiment 3: {NAFTA: US - Mexico - Canada}
and
{MERCOSUR: Argentina - Brazil}




Experiment 5: {WHFTA: US - Mexico - Canada - Chile -
Argentina - Brazil - Colombia}
Experiments illustrate how different PTAs in the Western
Hemisphere might affect a major traded commodity.
Figure 1. A Schematic of Preferential Trading
Arrangements
equivalents of 50 percent followed by Chile and
Colombia at 40 percent and Mexico at 5 percent.
Thus, we would anticipate that the removal of pro-
tection by Brazil would have the largest import
effect, other things being equal. U.S. and Cana-
dian wheat programs and Argentine wheat export
taxes are assumed to continue at the 1987 subsidy
(tax) levels,
For fruit and vegetable juices, import tariffs are
assumed to be the only government policy inter-
vention. The tariffs are based on the statutory rate
in 1987 and are calculated as a weighted average of
the different types of fruit and vegetable juices
from all sources. The U.S. and Canadian import
tariff are approximately 15 and 5 percent, respec-
tively. Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina are export-
ers thus no changes are made in their price wedges.
The simulation results describe the impact of
various regional arrangements for a typical year
after each scenario is fully implemented and the
agricultural sectors of the participating and non-
participating countries have had several 1987-like
years in which to adjust. Results for each of the
following experiments are reported as percent and
value changes from actual conditions in 1987 (i.e.,
changes from the 1987 base solution).
Wheat
7See Dixitand Roningen or Liapis, Rrk.soff, and Neff for mnre In experiment 1 we assume that the United States
details on the Annington assumption in the SWOPSIM framework. forms an agreement with Mexico. This is modeled52 April 1993
by removing the price wedge that represents Mex-
ican import restrictions for U.S. wheat. The elim-
ination of Mexican border protection reduces the
domestic price in Mexico of U.S. wheat imports
and encourages increased Mexican consumption.
U.S. exports to Mexico expand 20 percent from
the 1987 base period (Table 1). Since Mexico is a
small importer of wheat the increase in total U.S.
wheat exports is negligible (indicated by a 0.1 per-
cent in the column labeled WORLD). There is al-
most no effect on any other country.
In experiment 2 the United States, Mexico, and
Canada form an agreement and Mexico eliminates
border protection on wheat imports from the
United States and from Canada. Once again this
reduces the Mexican domestic price of wheat and
provides the incentive to increase wheat imports
from the United States and also Canada. U.S, and
Canadian wheat exports to Mexico expand 18 and
12percent, respectively (Table 2). With Canada in
the PTA, the U.S. export expansion is reduced.
The advantage to Canada in participating in the
agreement, therefore, is to increase its share of the
Mexican import market. In this sense a plttrilateral
regional arrangement is preferable to Canada
rather than a hub-and-spoke (see experiment 4).
However, since Mexico is a small importer of
wheat, the increase in global U.S. and Canadian
wheat exports is marginal. Once again there is ba-
sically no effect on any other country.
In experiment 3, we assume separate regional
agreements among the United States, Mexico, and
Canada (NAFTA), and Argentina and Brazil
(MERCOSUR). The two importing countries,
Mexico and Brazil, eliminate border protection
vis-a-vis their partners. These policy changes
lower the prices of U.S. and Canadian exports to
Mexican consumers and the prices of Argentine
wheat in Brazil. U.S. and Canadian exports to
Mexico increase as before, 18 and 12 percent, and
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Argentina expands its exports to Brazil by 193 per-
cent (Table 3). Since Brazil is an important im-
porter of Argentine wheat, Argentine total wheat
exports expand 40 percent.
Other countries are effected by MERCOSUR. In
removing their import barriers, Brazil increases its
demand for Argentine wheat raising Argentine
wheat prices. With the increase in price, Rest-of-
World purchases nearly 15percent less wheat from
Argentina and purchases marginally more from the
United States and Canada. More importantly, from
the perspective of the United States and Canada,
both countries’ wheat exports to Brazil decline 23
percent. Since Brazil is a relatively small importer
of U.S. wheat and there is an expansion of U.S.
wheat exports to Mexico, Colombia, and Rest-of-
World, there is a marginal increase, 0.1 percent, in
overall U.S. wheat exports. However, Brazil is a
relatively large importer of Canadian wheat; the
decline in Brazilian imports leads to a marginal
decline, 0.3 percent, of total Canadian wheat ex-
ports despite the increased purchases by Mexico,
Colombia, and Rest-of-World.
In experiment 4 a hub-and-spoke arrangement is
assumed with the United States as the hub. Each of
the four wheat importing countries eliminates their
restrictive barriers vis-a-vis the United States.
Canada and Argentina enter in no agreements.
Thus, U.S. exports to Mexico, Brazil, Chile and
Colombia become comparatively less expensive in
these four countries and there is an increase in
demand for U.S. wheat relative to wheat from
other exporters and domestic producers. U.S. ex-
ports increase significantly: 19 percent to Mexico;
292 percent to Brazil; 200 percent to Chile; and 62
percent to Colombia (Table 4). U.S. exports to
other countries declined 0.6 percent. While some
of these changes are large percentages they repre-
sent only a 1.3 percent increase in overall U.S.
wheat exports.
Table 1. Experiment 1 (U.S. and Mexico): Change From Base in Value of Wheat Trade
Importer
Rest of
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--------------------------------------------------------- percent ---------------------------------------------------------
















Total imports 5.3 –1,3 4.8
The hub-and-spoke experiment adversely affects
wheat exports from Canada and Argentina, albeit
marginally. Both of these exporters experience a
decline of less than 1 percent of their overall ex-
ports,
In our last experiment a Western Hemisphere
free trade agreement (WHFTA) is assumed to be
formed: the NAFTA countries, United States,
Canada, Mexico, accept Chile as a member coun-
try; the expanded NAFTA signs an agreement with
MERCOSUR to remove all import barriers against
all member countries; and Colombia joins the
agreement (as a representative of the Andean coun-
tries).
In WHIWA the United States expands exports to
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia experiencing
a 1percent rise in overall wheat exports (Table 5).
Brazil accounts for nearly 50 percent of the in-
crease. Canada expands exports to Mexico and
Brazil attaining nearly a 2 percent increase in over-
all exports. Argentina expands exports to Brazil
and Colombia reaching a 28 percent increase in
overall exports. Note, however, that WHFTA rel-
ative to MERCOSUR, leaves Argentina with a
smaller increase in wheat exports. This is not sur-
prising since the United States and Canada com-
pete with Argentina in the Brazilian market.
These results provide quantitative illustrations
of Wonnacott’s hypothesis about the differential
effects of a hub-and-spoke compared to a plurilat-
eral regional agreement. Our results show that
U.S. wheat exports would expand more with a
hub-and-spoke agreement than with a WHFTA,
but wheat exports of Canada and Argentina would
decline. As equal participants with the United
States in a plurilateral arrangement, Canada mar-
ginally expands exports while Argentina signifi-
cantly gains in their trade patterns.
In all five experiments, the domestic markets of
the importing countries are affected. Regardless of
participants in the PTA, importing member coun-
tries have less than a 4 percent reduction in the
production of wheat when import protection is re-
moved. There is one exception, Colombia, which




Exporter Mexico Brazil Colombia World World
United States
------------------------------------------------------- percent -------------------------------------------------------
17.8 – 22.9 1.4 0.1 0.1
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19.4 291.6 200.4 62.3 –0.6 1,3
0 –3.0 – 17.1 0.2 –0,1
–3.0 – 17.0 0.4 –0.7
o –3.1 – 17.2 0 5.5
4,0 7.4 176.4 11.9 –0,2
.....-...............................-------- .......- million dollars -----------------------------------------------------
2.9 40,7 11.0 22.4 –24.6 52.4
–0.2 –3.6 3.8 5.4 –2.2
–4.7 –1.6 2.0 –4.3
– 0.2 –3.3 –5.3 –8.8
2.5 29.1 11.0 11.7 – 17.2 37.1
has a thin domestic market. On the consumer side,
the removal of import barriers raises overall con-
sumption in the importing countries. For Brazil,
total consumption increases 12 percent with a
WHFTA.
Fruit and Vegetable Juices
In experiment 1 the United States eliminates its
bilateral import tariff with respect to Mexico. 8 As
a consequence, U.S. consumers of imported Mex-
ican fruit and vegetable juices experience a decline
in price and Mexican exports to the United States
expands over 24 percent (Table 6), With the in-
8 We did not remove the Mexicanadvaloremtariffonjuiceimports
becausethe volumeof importswereminimalfor tbe base year. The
Arrnington framework is particularly dependent on base levels; changes
in Mexican demand would be marginal withtheelimination nf the impnrl
tariff
creased consumption by U,S. consumers of Mex-
ican fruit and vegetable juices, the traded price of
Mexican juices increases diminishing consumption
by Canadian and Rest-of-World consumers of
Mexican juice by approximately 8 percent, Since
the United States is a major importer of fruit and
vegetable juices, the increase in consumption in
the U.S. market outweighs the declining purchases
of other foreign consumers and overall Mexican
fruit and vegetable juice exports expand by nearly
9 percent. Brazil and other smaller exporters ex-
perience less than 1 percent decline in trade to the
United States.
Overall, the United States increases its foreign
fruit and vegetable juice imports by over 1percent.
The increase in Mexican exports, though, has only
a marginal effect on the Mexican share of the U.S.
market; sales share increases less than a half a
percent. The Brazilian and U.S. producer shares of
the U.S. market each decline minimally.




Exporter Mexico Brazil Chile Colombia World World
--------------------------------------------------------- percent ---------------------------------------------------------
United States 17.8 137.6 200.5
Canada
19.7 0 1.0
10.5 66.5 0 –0.7 1.9
Argentina 134.2 15.0 – 10.5 28.2
Other – 2.6 –41.3 4.1
Total imports
–27.5
8.2 66.6 176.5 10.0 –0.9
..--------------------------------------------------- million dollars -----------------------------------------------------





77.9 0.1 –21.9 59.0
Argentina 209.7 1,4 – 44.7
Other
166.4
–0.3 – 44.2 –0,1 1.3 –43.3
Total imports 5.3 262.6 10,9 9.9 –65.9 222.8Krissoff and Sharples
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Table 6. Experiment 1 (U.S. and Mexico):




Exporter States Canada World World
--------------------- percent ---------------------
United States
Mexico 24.3 –8.1 –8.9 8.7
Brazil – .4
Argentina – ,4
Other – .4 –0.2
Total imports 1.2 0 0
---------------- million dollars ----------------
United States




Total imports 11.2 – .2 – .2 10.8
The value of fruit and vegetable trade is estimated by multiply-
ing the volume of trade times an average U.S. import unit
value.
In experiment 2, the NAFTA simulation, the
United States and Canada eliminate their import
tariffs with respect to each other and with respect
to Mexico. Canadian consumers face relatively
lower prices of U.S. produced fruit and vegetable
juices and U.S. bilateral exports increase 11 per-
cent. Since Canada is an important importer of
U.S. fruit and vegetable juices, the increased Ca-
nadian purchases contribute to the total expansion
of the U.S. fruit and vegetable juice exports of
over 3 percent (Table 7). U.S. imports also expand
from Canada and Mexico contributing to these
countries’ increases in overall fruit and vegetable
juice exports, nearly 27 and 24 percent, respec-
tively.g Mexico expands marginally less in the
NAFTA experiment compared to a U, S.—
Mexican experiment because of the slight increase
in competition from Canada. There also is some
trade diversion in this scenario as the U.S. pur-
chases less fruit and vegetable juices from Brazil
and Rest-of-World.
In the hub-and-spoke experiment the hub (U.S.)
removes its import tariffs vis-a-vis the spokes
(other Western Hemisphere exporting countries)
and the spokes remove their tariffs, to the extent
that they exist, vis-a-vis and United States. Con-
sumers in the U.S. benefit by facing a 6 to 7 per-
cent decrease in the price of Canadian, Mexican,
9 U.S. specific tariffs on juices are refundable if the imporring firm
re-expnrts a comparable amount within three years. Thisdrawback ar-
rangement is notconsidered inthesimulations.
Table 7. Experiment 2 (NAFTA): Change





















23.7 3.6 –8.9 21,8
–0.8 1.1 0 –0.4
–0.8 1.1 0 – 0.4
27.9 –5.7 26.7
– 0.9 1.1 0
1.7 2.6 0
---------------- million dollars ----------------
6.7 6.8
14.4 0,1 0.1 14.3
–4.5 0.8 –0,2 –3.4
–0.6 0.1 0.3 –0.5
9,2 0 9.1
–2.2 1.9 –0.1 -0.3
16.3 9.6 0.2 26.1
Argentine, and Brazilian fruit and vegetable juices
and they increase their foreign purchases by about
14 percent (Table 8). The U,S. share of the U.S.
fruit and vegetable juice market declines 3 percent.
With the U.S. being a major importer, the in-
creases in total exports for these Western Hemi-
sphere countries are nearly as high as the percent
increase in exports to the United States. For Mex-
ico and Canada, the 19 and 21 percent increase in
exports to the U.S. translates into nearly 17 and 20
percent in total exports. For Argentine and Brazil-
Table 8. Experiment 3 (Hub and Spoke):




Exporter States Canada World World
--------------------- percent ---------------------
United States 5.1 3.3 3.9
Mexico 18.5 –3.8 – 6.2 16.8
Brazil 21.0 –2.2 –4.1 10,4
Argentina 20.7 1.1 –4.6 11,5
Canada 21,0 20.2
Other –5.8 2.6 – 2.7
Total imports 13,9 1.5 2,1
---------------- million dollars ----------------
United States 3,0 5.2 8.2
Mexico 11.3 –0.1 –0.2 11.0
Brazil 117.6 –1.6 – 14.3 101.7
Argentina 13.8 –0.1 –1.5 12.2
Canada 6.9 6.9
Other – 14.2 5.0 –9.2
Total imports 135.4 6.2 10.8 130,856 April 1993 ARER
ian fruit and vegetable juice trade, the U.S. is less
important as an importer. Brazil exports 57 percent
of its fruit and vegetable juices to the United
States, relying more heavily on Canada (7 percent)
and Rest-of-World (36 percent). In this hub-and-
spoke simulation Brazil expands exports by over
21 percent to the United States but this amounts to
only 10 percent in total Brazilian fruit and vegeta-
ble juice exports.
Interestingly Rest-of-World exports less and im-
ports more fruit and vegetable juices in this exper-
iment. The Rest-of-World export decline is due to
the U.S. diverting purchases away from the ROW
and to the spokes. The ROW increase in imports,
which is mainly from the United States, is due to
the relative decline in traded prices for U.S. fruit
and vegetable juice. U.S. prices fall 2 percent as
U.S. consumers reduce their demand for domestic
fruit and vegetable juices and increase their pur-
chases of fruit and vegetable juices from other
Western Hemisphere countries. Note, that U.S.
producers benefit from the increase in foreign de-
mand—from Rest-of-World, Canada, and Mexico,
and thus, U.S. production falls less than 2 percent.
A Western Hemisphere FTA experiment pro-
vides similar results to the hub-and-spoke experi-
ment (Table 9). This is not surprising since the
U.S. and non-Western Hemisphere countries are
so critical for the exporting countries that is does
not matter significantly if other Western Hemi-
sphere countries remove their barriers vis-a-vis
each other. The only notable difference in the two
experiments is that with the WHFTA, Canadian
Table 9. Experiment 4 (Western Hemisphere
FTA): Change From Base in Value of Fruit
and Vegetable Juice Trade
Importer
United Rest of
Exporter States Canada World World
--------------------- percent ---------------------
United States 13.6 3.1 6.0
Mexico 18.6 5.2 17.1
Brazil 21.2 –3.0 –4.2 10.4
Argentina 20.3 43.7 –5.1 12.6
Canada 21.9 21.0
Other -5.8 1.0 –3.4
Total imports 14,0 2.8 –2,2
---------------- million dollars ----------------
United States 7.9 4.7 12.6
Mexico 11.3 0.1 11.4
Brazil 117,6 – 2.2 – 14.6 101.8
Argentina 13.6 1.6 –1.5 13.7
Canada 7.2 7.2
Other – 13.9 1,8 – 12.1
Total imports 136.8 9.2 11.4 134.6
fruit and vegetable juice imports rise providing
some additional benefits to the other Western
Hemisphere exporters including the United States.
Canadian exports also increase. Thus, a WHFTA
generates a greater expansion of trade than the
hub-and-spoke.
Sensitivity Analysis
Three variants of a WHFTA experiment are under-
taken to provide some sensitivity of our analysis to
changes in parameter values. First, we doubled the
U.S. demand elasticity; the removal of the U.S.
import tariff lowers import prices and, with the
larger responsiveness of U.S. demand for foreign
juices, generates a 15.9 percent increase in total
U.S. imports compared to 14.0 percent in our ini-
tial WHFTA experiment. Second, we doubled the
U.S, demand and supply elasticities; an enhance-
ment of consumer and producer responsiveness
augments U.S. imports by 16,3 percent rather than
14 percent. These two variants of the WHITA
experiment, therefore, suggest that even large
changes in our demand and supply elasticity pa-
rameters lead to only small changes in total im-
ports.
The third variation of the WHFTA experiment
provides a much larger shock; we double-demand
and supply elasticities and the elasticities of sub-
stitution between U.S. and foreign produced
juices. Increasing the elasticity of substitution im-
plies that American consumers are less discerning
with respect to domestic and foreign produced
juices. Total U,S. imports expand 22.4 percent,
rather than 14 percent, suggesting that the more
substitutable the foreign and domestic juices are,
the larger the effect of a price change on U.S.
imports.
Conclusions
In this paper we present quantitative examples of
how various PTAs might affect U.S. agriculture.
These rough estimates give quantitative content to
the theoretical discussions of other authors. We
examine the impact of alternative PTAs among
Western Hemisphere countries on wheat trade and
on fruit and vegetable juice trade. These two com-
modities were chosen to illustrate the effects of
different country participation in alternative trade
arrangements. In wheat, the U.S., Canada, and
Argentina compete in both Western Hemisphere
and non-Western Hemisphere markets. In fruit and
vegetable juices, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and
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compete for the U.S., Canadian, and non-Western
Hemisphere markets.
Two conclusions may be drawn from our anal-
ysis. First, countries usually wish to participate in
PTAs in order to expand export markets. Our re-
sults show that export expansion occurs but the
extent of the expansion depends upon the type of
agreement and which other countries are party to
the agreement. Second, the impact of any of five
PTAs examined here for wheat and juices would
have relatively small impacts upon U.S. consum-
ers and producers, but they could have major im-
pacts on trade of some of the countries.
These results are largely dependent on the size
of the domestic market of each participating coun-
try and the share of that market represented by
trade. The United States has a large domestic mar-
ket but trade represents a small share of it. The
Latin American states have (relatively) small do-
mestic markets but trade represents a large share.
Elasticity estimates are less important.
Our experiments demonstrate that the United
States and Canada are only marginally affected by
Western Hemisphere preferential trading arrange-
ments in wheat. Depending on country participa-
tion in the PTA, total U.S. wheat exports expand
in the range of 0.1 to 1.3 percent. Canadian ex-
ports could change from – 0.3 to + 1.9 percent.
Argentina, on the other hand could gain much
more significantly, as high as 40 percent. This re-
flects the importance of Brazil as an import market
for Argentina.
With respect to fruit and vegetable juice, our
experiments indicate that each Western Hemi-
sphere country could increase its exports by as
much as 20 percent relative to each country’s ini-
tial value of exports. The main factor in determin-
ing the trade expansion is access to the U.S. mar-
ket. As a purchaser of fruit and vegetable juice,
U.S. imports also could rise moderately, up to 14
percent, depending on which country participates
in the trade arrangement.
The experiments provide quantitative examples
of how a hub-and-spoke type of PTA would affect
trade flows relative to the same countries joining a
free trade (plurilateral) agreement. The hub-and-
spoke expanded wheat exports of the hub (U.S.)
more than with a plurilateral arrangement. On the
other hand, wheat exporting spokes would export
less wheat with a hub-and-spoke than with a plu-
rilateral arrangement. As for the case of a domi-
nant importing hub (the U,S. in fruit and vegetable
juices), the results for the hub are virtually the
same as with a plurilateral agreement. However, in
the case where another fruit and vegetable import-
ing country (Canada) is added to the agreement,
the exporting spokes can increase their export
gains with a plurilateral agreement.
These wheat and fruit and vegetable juice ex-
periments also show that as countries are added to
an existing agreement all other members are af-
fected, albeit marginally in some cases. If addi-
tional exporting countries are added to an agree-
ment, countries already in the agreement could
lose exports. Some could expand exports at the
expense of non-participants if additional importing
countries are added to an agreement.
The results from the simulations should be in-
terpreted in context; they are illustrative examples.
They indicate what might have happened if a PTA
existed under world market conditions as observed
in 1987, and if all other exogenous variables per-
tinent to the markets remained the same. Changes
in macroeconomic variables such as income
growth, for example, are not considered. If a com-
prehensive PTA generated increased economic
growth among importing Western Hemisphere
countries, we would anticipate a larger trade ex-
pansion for member exporters than reported here,
Other changes generated by a PTA such as invest-
ment, exchange rates, capital flows, and relative
prices across sectors also would feedback to agri-
cultural markets and could substantially modify
our findings.
Since we only considered two commodities, any
broad conclusion concerning the benefits of a PTA
would be unfounded. 10To try to develop a fuller
understanding of the implications of various PTA
arrangements, additional commodities would need
to be examined and general equilibrium conditions
and intertemporal producer and consumer decision
making would need to be considered.
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